What motivates Israel against Iran in Syria?

Israel launched one of its deadliest attacks in Syria on March 29, striking a facility in southern Aleppo, killing forty people. Three days later, in an unconventional move, the Iranian embassy in Damascus was bombed, killing seven military officers, including three senior commanders, according to the Iranian government.

According to Arman Mahmoudian, a doctoral candidate in politics and international affairs at the University of South Florida and an assistant professor in the Judy Genshaft Honors College at the University of South Florida, there is a question: Why would Israel risk opening a new front when its military campaign in Gaza has not yet ended? Although this behavior may seem uncalculated, Israel’s logic is completely understandable for various reasons.

The writer explained in his article on the National Interest website: First, it is necessary to realize that one of the main reasons why Israel was surprised by the Hamas attacks was to shift its attention to other fronts.

Second, similar to concerns about the military buildup in Syria, the IDF should be concerned about expanding military supplies from Iran to Hezbollah. Israeli officials stated that, since the beginning of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, Iran has increased its efforts to deliver air defense systems, such as the Shahed-101 and Shahed-136 drones, and small Ababil missiles to Hezbollah.

Before that, the Tehran-based Tasnim news agency of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard reported that Hezbollah had been equipped with advanced Iranian Almas anti-tank missiles.

Given that Syria is Iran’s land bridge to Lebanon, by increasing military pressure on Iran in Syria, the IDF may aim to disrupt these arms transfers to Hezbollah.

The depth of Israeli fears

In order to understand the depth of Israeli fears about further arming Hezbollah, the writer explained that we must take into account the impact of attacks launched by Hamas, which is much weaker than Hezbollah. Thousands of Israeli residents in the north of the country, near the border with Lebanon, were evacuated after seeing the devastation inflicted on the southern settlements.

Iran spent between 20 and 30 billion dollars in Syria and lost more than 2,000 soldiers.

Iran may be concerned that any major escalation with Israel would change the dynamics of the war in Gaza, which currently favors Iran. Although this war is causing an unbearable level of suffering among civilians, Hamas’s military capacity is still functioning, as it has retained two-thirds of its pre-war capacity.

This may encourage Iran and its “axis of resistance” to believe that increasing pressure on Israel may force the IDF to cease operations without achieving its goal of dismantling Hamas. Therefore, Iran may avoid escalating tensions with Israel, as further escalation could turn the situation in Israel’s favor.

However, the writer says: One might argue that while Tehran appears committed to the principle of strategic patience, the revolutionary government has another concern: securing its domestic credibility, which the increasing number of Israeli attacks could erode.

In this context, Iran may use indirect retaliatory measures by having its proxies target Israeli embassies and employees around the world, conduct cyberattacks, attack Israeli commercial ships in the Red Sea, and so on.

When choosing any of these options, the writer believes that Tehran must carefully study Israel’s reaction and how to respond, which constitutes a dilemma whose results will not be revealed until the appropriate time. (website 24)