A crisis threatens Hezbollah.. This is how it lost the most prominent minds!

The issue of the assassination of Zahedi and other key Iranian leaders puts the party in front of a dilemma related to the “absence of pivotal pillars” in the combat action against Israel. Actually, the party’s first major loss was in 2008 when Tel Aviv assassinated its martyred military leader, Imad Mughniyeh, in Damascus. Despite the painful blow with the departure of Mughniyeh, Iran has since been able to make the party move further forward, as the actual contribution within it was present in more than one field, and the evidence was during the Syrian war that began in 2011. There, the party was present and continues to this day under its sponsorship. Actual action by the Iranians, despite all the talk about a withdrawal that occurred over the past years. In practice, the party’s presence in Syria may be limited to those concerned with manufacturing weapons and transporting them to Lebanon, and their primary role may also be in coordination with the Iranians and with Zahedi in particular.

After Mughniyeh’s assassination, the party’s goal was to build on what the latter left behind, creating a leadership generation that is considered an extension of Mughniyeh’s thought, but the main question here is: Was anyone able to fill the void created by Mughniyeh’s absence? This issue needs a pivotal explanation, but some of the gaps that appeared in the current war on the South Lebanon front revealed that the party needs a new evaluation process for military performance, especially since the losses it suffered are many and numerous, both on the human side and on the logistical and military side.

In 2006, after long field and combat experience, Mughniyeh was able to fight the July War against Israel according to military and intelligence standards that differed from what things are now. In 18 years, all the balances have changed. Hezbollah has changed and changed, and its scope has expanded, while the violations it faces have become more and deeper due to its geographical expansion on more than one front, arena, and region.

The experience that Mughniyeh had was extensive, and when the party lost him, Iran intervened with similar leaders to manage the party’s military affairs, at least by refining capabilities, strengthening combat units, and empowering the security system within it. One of the most prominent officials responsible for this march was Zahedi, while the commander of the “Quds Force,” Qassem Soleimani, was the most prominent pillar of the party’s support and development over the past years, especially during the Syrian war and also after the July War.

It is true that Mughniyeh’s absence was influential, but the presence of Soleimani, Zahedi, and others with the party established a kind of reassurance.. But, what will happen later after the elimination of the most prominent “minds” from whom the party benefited?

With the loss of Zahedi, Soleimani, and other leaders, most notably Wissam al-Taweel, and prominent field officials in the party’s missile units, such as Ali Naeem, the latter is left with pivotal “vacuums” that he must fill in order to reach a new place at the leadership level. Here, what clearly appears is that Israel intends to “bomb the minds” on which the party relied so much, using military action, assassinations, and liquidation operations, and the basis for this is to destroy the Lebanese organization’s ability to fight using traditional and other weapons.

During the previous assassinations that targeted the party’s leaders since the start of the Gaza War on October 7, the Israeli goal was clear in focusing on specific people to liquidate them, and the purpose of this step was to break a basic base for the party that almost constitutes an “important structure” for its later military continuity. Here, this matter did not only affect the main leaders of the party, but also included the parties that the latter needs to rely on, which means that the “story of the wings” is now imposing itself on the field and in war, whether within the party or even at the level of its Iranian allies.

Based on all of this, it can be considered that the current reality has imposed on the party a new battle entitled “Establishing new and pivotal leadership.” The current war has revealed new fighting patterns that did not exist previously. Implicitly, it may be in the party’s interest for this war to occur in order to discover strengths and weaknesses and determine new developmental paths.
The “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation may be a path toward two turning points: the first is to develop the party and benefit from all the lessons of the current war to survive and continue, while the second turning point will be a sign of the party’s trend towards weakness and decline…and of course, the lesson is in what the coming days and years will hold.